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The efficiency of Public and Publicly-Subsidized High Schools in Spain. Evidence 
from PISA-2006. 
 
Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to compare the efficiency of Spanish public and publicly-
subsidized private high schools by Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), employing the 
results provided by a hierarchical linear model (HLM) applied to PISA-2006 
(Programme for International Students Assessment) microdata. The study places special 
emphasis on the estimation of the determinants of school outcomes, the educational 
production function being estimated through an HLM that takes into account the nested 
nature of PISA data. Inefficiencies are then measured through DEA and decomposed 
into two types: managerial (related to individual performance), and program (related to 
structural differences between management models), following the approach adopted by 
Silva Portela & Thanassoulis (2001). Once differences in students’ background, school 
resources and individual management inefficiencies are removed, the results reveal that 
Spanish public high schools are more efficient than their publicly-subsidized private 
equivalents. 
 
Keywords: Efficiency; educational finance; resource allocation; PISA. 
 
JEL codes: I21, I22, I28. 
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1. Introduction 
 
One of the defining characteristics of the Spanish compulsory educational system is its 
mixed or dual nature i.e. a predominant public network but a substantial private sector. 
Within the latter, an important position is occupied by publicly-subsidized private 
schools (hereafter PSPS). PSPS, which account for 26% of secondary school enrolment 
in Spain, are owned and run privately, yet financed by local education authorities and 
the central government through a system of agreements regulated by the 1985 Right to 
Education Act (LODE, in its Spanish initials)1. The Spanish policy of financing certain 
private schools is aimed at allowing parents to choose freely between different schools 
and, indirectly, at stimulating inter-school competition to attract and retain students, 
which should generate improved school efficiency. 
 
The Spanish PSPS system is based on an administrative model which establishes the 
reciprocal rights and obligations of the owner of the private centre and the Education 
Authority, with regard to the financial conditions, duration, extension and termination 
of the agreement and other conditions for the provision of education2.  
 
Formally, the Spanish PSPS system may be seen as a singular mechanism of public 
intervention in the education sector, combining the public funding and the private 
management of schools. These peculiar characteristics of PSPS invite an exploration of 
the efficiency of such schools compared to public schools (hereafter PS). The scarcity of 
research in Spain into the impact of these two alternative systems of free educational 
provision (public and publicly-subsidized) upon student performance justifies such a 
politically interesting analysis. Is the private management model of Spanish PSPS more 
efficient than the public management model of Spanish PS? Ultimately, this is the 
                                                          
1 Student distribution among different school types in Spain is as follows: PS 67%, PSPS 26% and 
private-independent schools 7%. 
2 PSPS’ obligations include the following: to provide free teaching at the agreed educational level, to 
request authorization for the charging of any fees for complementary activities, to maintain a specific 
pupil/teacher ratio and to apply the same admission criteria as PS. In exchange, the Administration 
undertakes to finance the activity of the school, through a system of economic modules per educational 
establishment, as established in the General State Budget.  
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question the present study is intended to answer, employing the data provided by the 
third wave of the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA-2006), 
implemented by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD).  
 
An initial examination of the average scores for PISA-2006 outcomes could lead to the 
conclusion that PSPS are more efficient than PS, since the crude (uncontrolled) results 
are higher in the former. It is true that the average score for science competencies for 
PSPS is 502.86 and 475.08 for PS (the average score for the whole population being 
488.40), while the ANOVA test (5.89) indicates significant statistical differences 
between these two results. However, focusing on output variables would only be fair if 
school resources were identical (Kirjavainen & Loikkanen, 1998), and in fact PS and 
PSPS differ as much in the inputs they employ as in their outputs. The principal 
differences are concentrated in pupil characteristics (socio-economic status, parents’ 
educational level and employment, and immigration status), as Table A1 in the 
Appendix shows. Since several studies have proven that these characteristics affect 
students’ academic results (Sirin, 2005), the challenge is to evaluate the performance of 
schools in a multi-dimensional setting.  
 
In order to assess the impact of ownership upon school efficiency, we apply a non-
parametric frontier analysis to the sample of Spanish PSPS and PS participating in 
PISA-2006. The theoretical framework is provided by research dedicated to assessing 
the net differential quality of public and private schools. The seminal work by Coleman, 
Hoffer and Kilgore (1982) is commonly considered as the origin of this literature. The 
empirical methodologies used in this paper are hierarchical linear modeling (hereafter 
HLM) and data envelopment analysis (hereafter DEA). As far as we are aware, no paper 
has employed the two methodologies jointly for the assessment of school efficiency. 
 
Two aspects distinguish the present study from previous research. Firstly, special 
attention is paid to the empirical estimation of the underlying educational technology in 
the PISA-2006 data. The hierarchical structure of this dataset means that estimations 
must be performed via HLM. The conclusions extracted from these regressions allow us 
to select the variables for the subsequent DEA efficiency analysis in a robust empirical 
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fashion. Secondly, our study decomposes the overall inefficiencies of each school into 
two components: managerial (resulting from its individual performance) and program 
(resulting from the structural differences between public and private management 
models). In order to perform this decomposition, we apply the approach of Silva Portela 
& Thanassoulis (2001), itself based on Charnes, Cooper & Rhodes (1981). 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the literature 
devoted to studying the relationship between school efficiency and public or private 
ownership. The estimation of the determinants of educational outcomes in PISA-2006 is 
performed in Section 3. The empirical assessment of the efficiency of Spanish PS and 
PSPS is presented in Section 4, and the final section offers a summary of the principal 
conclusions. 
 
2. The efficiency of public and private schools: previous studies 
 
It is a fairly widely-held belief in certain academic and social circles that private schools 
are more efficient than public ones, an evaluation based upon the economic reasoning 
which links efficiency to free market competition.  
 
For advocates of private schools, the competition which these schools are subjected to 
(both from within their own system and from public schools), due to their need to attract 
students, forces them to be highly receptive to their customers’ demands and stimulates 
both an efficient use of resources and an improvement in the quality of the education 
provided (Chubb & Moe, 1990; Friedman & Friedman, 1981). It has been stated that the 
survival and economic success of private schools is strongly dependent upon their 
satisfying user desires and expectations, forcing them to act efficiently and effectively: 
efficiently, since otherwise what they provide will be at a disadvantage to the 
competition, and effectively, since if they do not satisfy their customers’ demands, 
students may leave in search of better service (Alchian, 1950). In short, the threat of 
closure faced by private schools, if badly managed, leads invisibly to such schools 
acting optimally. 
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By contrast, public schools are seen as monopolies at a local level, with a captive 
audience guaranteed by the criterion of assigning school places on the basis of 
residential area (Peterson, 1990; Levin, 1976; Pincus, 1974; O’Donogue, 1971). The 
opportunity for public school pupils to enroll elsewhere is therefore very limited, and 
would involve the “Tieboutian” method of “voting with your feet” (Tiebout, 1956) 
which, apart from being very costly in economic terms, is strongly influenced by 
circumstances other than strictly educational ones. Furthermore, the alternative of 
changing to a private school is also strongly conditioned by the price differential 
between public and private supply, and thus, as Chubb & Moe (1990) point out, this 
option will only be adopted in cases where the value of private schools, as perceived by 
families, is much higher than that of public schools. Nor must we forget that this 
possibility is, of course, limited to the minority of the population with the greatest 
financial resources. These considerations have led various authors to consider that, in 
contrast to private schools, the achievement of efficiency and a satisfactory response to 
consumer demands is of merely secondary importance in public schools.  
 
However, a more detailed analysis of schools’ day-to-day functioning calls the above 
reasoning into question, since the ability of users in the education sector to exercise an 
informed choice – a key element for guaranteeing the potential benefits from 
competition– is very limited, given the ambiguous nature of the concept of school 
quality. 
 
In fact, after almost forty years of research into the subject, our knowledge of the factors 
which contribute to defining what is a “good school” remains very sketchy (see 
Hanushek, 2003, 1997 and 1986). Schools are to a large extent still “black boxes” for 
the academics who research them, and even more so for their users. This is due to the 
peculiarities of the education system’s production process, which makes it difficult to 
clarify the responsibilities attributable to schools and the definition of a representative 
concept of school quality (see Mancebón & Bandrés, 1999). Given this context, the best 
way to assess how well a school functions is by direct contact with it. However, “trying 
out the product” in the educational sphere involves major personal costs, given the 
problems of adaptation which changing schools usually involves. This is what 
Glennerster (1991) terms the “sunk costs” associated with school choice.  
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The immediate consequence of this situation may be that individuals who must choose 
between different schooling alternatives do so on the basis of highly visible variables 
such as the religious leanings of the school, its facilities, its extra-curricular activities, 
the type of students attending, proximity to the home and so on. All of these factors are 
of a non-academic nature, and their relationship to the quality of the actual education 
provided has not been clearly established. On occasions, families may possess 
information concerning schools’ average academic results although, as Echols & 
Willms (1995) underline, these are inadequate indicators of quality unless accompanied 
by information on the academic and/or socio-economic background of pupils. Lee, 
Croninger & Smith (1996) discuss the problem of making decisions regarding education 
on the basis of virtually anecdotal or extremely superficial evidence of school quality, 
given that any other more thorough assessment would mean assuming significant 
information-related costs.  
 
These limitations upon access to information regarding schools bring seriously into 
question the contention that competition has any effect upon the quality of schools, 
whether public or private, since users are unable to observe and measure such quality. 
The theoretical argument of those who defend private education, in the terms described 
above, is therefore questionable.  
 
Additionally, empirical research devoted to clarifying the relationship between school 
efficiency and public or private ownership is not conclusive. The origins of this 
literature are in Coleman et al. (1982) who, using cross-section achievement equations, 
concluded that private schools were more effective than public schools at educating 
students, even after controlling for differences in the personal and socio-economic 
background of students. Since then, a number of studies have attempted to contrast this 
result in a wide range of educational contexts, through the use of parametric and non-
parametric techniques. Such literature has offered mixed conclusions: while a number of 
studies tend to confirm the results obtained by Coleman et al. (1982) (Opdenakker & 
Van Damme, 2006; Bettinger, 2005; Mizzala, Romaguera & Farren, 2002; Bedi & 
Garg, 2000; Stevans & Sessions, 2000; Neal, 1997; Jiménez, Lockheed & Paqueo, 
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1991; Chubb & Moe, 1990; Hanushek, 1986), in others the presumed superiority of 
private schools vanishes when the analysis includes a wide range of controls (Perelman 
& Santin, 2008; Mancebón & Muñiz, 2008; Calero & Escardíbul, 2007; Abburrà, 2005; 
Fertig, 2003; Kirjavainen & Loikkanen, 1998; Goldhaber, 1996; Sander, 1996) or is 
reduced to specific measurements of the output analyzed (Greene & Kang, 2004), or to 
specific groups of students defined by race, ethnic group, or academic or socio-
economic profile (Figlio & Stone, 1997). In some cases, there exists a different effect 
for independent private schools and for PSPS (Dronkers & Robert, 2008; Corten & 
Dronkers, 2006). Most such studies concern the American educational system and adopt 
a parametric approach. This explains why further research using different case studies 
and methodologies is needed, as Cherchye, De Witte, Ooghe & Nicaise (2010) point 
out. The present study may be seen as a new contribution to the puzzling debate on the 
relative efficiency of public and private schools, in the context of the Spanish 
educational system and using a non-parametric approach.  
 
3. Estimation of the determinants of academic achievement in PISA-2006 
 
This initial section is a first and necessary step for the correct selection of the input 
variables needed to feed the DEA analysis performed in the following section. 
Subsection 3.1 presents the literature review of the determinants of academic 
achievement. An econometric model is designed on the basis of this prior review, the 
results being presented in Subsection 3.3. Previously, Subsection 3.2 describes the data 
and methodology used in the analysis. 
 
3.1. Determinants of educational outcomes: literature review 
 
Our approach to the determinants of educational outcomes is structured by 
distinguishing between two levels, the first corresponding to student variables and the 
second to school variables. At the student level, we differentiate between three areas: 
firstly, personal variables; secondly, variables related to the socio-cultural and economic 
characteristics of the family; and thirdly, variables related to household resources and 
their use. At the school level, four different areas are established: firstly, general 
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variables describing the school; secondly, variables describing the school’s students 
(and therefore the peer-effects generated by the interaction between students); thirdly, 
variables related to the human and physical resources used by the school and, finally, a 
fourth group of variables describing certain educational processes the school 
undertakes. On the basis of this structure, the present subsection reviews the effect of 
these variables upon educational outcomes, taking into account recent theoretical 
developments and the empirical evidence available in the literature. 
 
At the student level, gender stands among the most important personal variables. Girls’ 
school performance is usually better than boys’; however, in the case of math and 
science competencies the opposite is true. In the three competencies measured in the 
PISA evaluation, for example, girls do better than boys only at reading, and lag behind 
in math and science (see OECD, 2006). 
 
Still at the student level, considerable empirical evidence has shown that household 
socio-cultural and socio-economic characteristics are strong determinants of educational 
outcomes. The immigration status of the family has received special attention in recent 
years. Empirical evidence indicates that students born abroad tend to underperform 
(even after controlling for other significant variables), while there are no significant 
differences between national students and students born in the country to foreign 
parents (see Calero & Escardíbul, 2007; Chiswick & Debburman, 2004; Kao & Tienda, 
1995; Rong & Grant, 1992). Schnepf (2008), using TIMSS, PIRLS and PISA data for a 
set of eight OECD countries, shows that in general there is great heterogeneity within 
the group of immigrant students, the dispersion of their educational outcomes being 
higher than that of national students. Other socio-cultural and socio-economic 
characteristics, such as parental educational level and socio-professional category, have 
also received much attention. Some of the most relevant studies exploring these effects 
are Dronkers (2008), Marks (2005), Gamoran (2001) and Rumberger & Larson (1998). 
 
The final set of variables at the student level concerns household resources and how 
students use them (see Calero & Escardíbul, 2007; Kang, 2007; Woessman, 2003). 
Research undertaken with PISA data has stressed the incidence on student outcome of 
the availability of books and the use of computers with educational objectives in the 
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household. Specifically, the availability of books in the household is a very strong 
determinant of student performance, since it represents the family’s cultural capital. 
 
At the school level, general school characteristics are the first area of determinants we 
shall address. Here, one of the most relevant factors, from both a theoretical and 
empirical point of view, is ownership type i.e. private or public. Evidence in this area is 
far from conclusive, as Section 2 shows. 
 
Several variables describing the characteristics of school students -or the classroom- are 
included in the second area of school level determinants. These characteristics 
influence, through peer effects, student performance. Authors such as Farley (2006), 
Willms (2006) and Coleman, Campbell, Hobson, McPartland, Mood, Weinfeld et al. 
(1966) have analyzed the incidence of the socio-cultural and socio-economic profiles of 
peers upon student performance. This kind of approach has also been used to analyze 
the peer effects generated by immigrant students. Calero & Escardíbul (2007) show, for 
example, how a high concentration of immigrant students is associated with negative 
effects on student performance. However, smaller concentrations of immigrant students 
do not generate any significant such effect. 
 
Another area of determinants at school level is their physical and human resources. The 
detailed review offered by Hanushek (2003) makes clear that results in this area are far 
from conclusive. In the OECD (2007), where PISA data are used, most of the variables 
related to the availability and use of resources by the school are not statistically 
significant. Mancebón & Muñiz (2003), after reviewing 42 studies published between 
1980 and 2002, suggest that a plausible explanation for the lack of significance of 
school resources in the explanation of student performance lies in the fact that most of 
the studies reviewed concern developed countries, with relatively high (and similar) 
levels of school resources. 
 
Schools’ educational processes are included in the fourth and final area of determinants 
at the school level. As an example of these processes we will refer solely to the 
grouping of students by ability level. Kang (2007) and Hanushek, Kain, Markman & 
Rivkin (2003) describe how the negative effect of interaction with low-ability students 
is higher for this same group of low-ability students. Thus, processes of student 
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grouping by ability level lead to negative effects on low-performing students. We could 
then expect the positive effect of grouping on high-performance students to be cancelled 
out by the negative effect on low-performance students, a situation which accounts for 
the results given by Gamoran (2004), who finds that these practices seldom produce the 
positive results expected. 
 
3.2. Data and methodology 
 
The present study uses PISA-2006 microdata for Spain. Since 2000, the PISA program 
has examined every three years the academic achievement of 15- year-old students from 
different countries3 in three competencies (reading, mathematics and science). PISA 
focused, in the year 2006, on the competency of science. PISA results are synthesized 
using a scale with an average score of 500 and a standard deviation of 100, for each of 
the three competencies. This scale is divided into six levels of proficiency, level 1 
corresponding to low-scorers and level 6 to those students who show high-level 
thinking and reasoning skills. 
 
PISA designs its sample using a two-stage method. In the first stage, a sample of 
schools is randomly selected from the entire list of centers providing schooling for 15-
year-olds. In the second stage, a random sample of 35 students is chosen from within 
each of the schools selected in the first stage. A school’s probability of being selected 
by PISA is proportional to its size. Consequently, larger centers are more likely to be 
selected; nevertheless, students in larger schools have lower probabilities of being 
selected than students enrolled in smaller schools. Therefore, the probability of a school 
being chosen is equal to the result of multiplying the size of the center ( iN ) by the 
number of schools selected for the sample ( cn ) and dividing by the total number of 15-
year-old students (N).  
 
N
nNp cii
.            (1) 
 
                                                          
3 28 OECD and 4 non-OECD countries took part in PISA-2000. 14 non-OECD members joined the 
program in 2002. 41 countries participated in PISA-2003. 57 countries (30 OECD; 27 non-OECD) took 
part in 2006. 
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TABLE 1 HERE 
 
The empirical analysis of the determinants of science competency scores in PISA-2006, 
which will be used as the main reference for the selection of variables for the DEA 
study, is based on HLM, due to the hierarchical structure of the PISA-2006 dataset4. 
The principle of the independence of variables among the students of each center is not 
maintained, as a consequence of the above-mentioned two-stage sampling method 
employed. Students enrolled in the same school usually share socio-economic 
circumstances which make the average correlation among the variables of students 
within the center to be higher than that found among students from different schools 
(Hox, 1995)5. 
 
HLM takes into account the nested structure of students in schools. HLM calculates a 
separate regression for each of the centers included in the sample (OECD, 2009a). 
Willms (2006) or Somers, McEwan & Willms (2004) are examples of the application of 
this methodology in the educational field.  
 
The present paper structures data into two levels: students (level 1) and centers (level 2). 
HLM allows the simultaneous analysis of the effects of variables of different levels and 
the influence of these variables on inequality within and between centers to be studied. 
In other words, HLM permits the identification of the proportion of the total variance in 
scholastic achievement which can be attributed to the characteristics of schools and 
students.  
 
0 1
1
n
ij j j kij ij
k
Y X  

    2~ (0, )ij N   (2) 
0 00 01 0
1
j lj jZ       0 0~ (0, )j N   (3) 
1 10 1j j     1 1~ (0, )j N   (4) 
00 10 01 1 0ij kij lj j kij j ijY X Z X            (5) 
                                                          
4 Bryk & Raudenbusch (1988) provide a soundly-argued justification for the convenience of applying 
multilevel models to analyzing the effects of schools on educational outcomes. 
5 The intra-class correlation in the scientific competencies for the sample used in this paper from a null 
model is 0.15. The intra-class correlation is the proportion of the total variance explained by the 
differences between schools. If the intra-class correlation were equal to zero, it would not be necessary to 
use a multi-level model (as the entire variance would be explained by the differences in within-school 
characteristics).  
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ijY  is the expected science score of student “i” enrolled in school “j”. kijX  is a vector of 
“k” independent variables of the individual level and jZ  is a vector of “l” variables of 
the school level. Equation 5 is obtained by substituting equations 3 and 4 (level 2) for 
the   in equation 2 (level 1). It is possible to distinguish in equation 5 a set of fixed 
effects 00 10 01( )kij ljX Z     from a set of random effects 1 0( )j kij j ijX    . 
 
The dependent variable is the science score for students enrolled in PS and PSPS6. This 
score is calculated using plausible values (PV hereafter) for each student and a 
replication method which permits efficient estimations to be obtained (OECD, 2009b). 
PV are random values calculated from the distribution of the results. In PISA, students 
only answer part of the items constituting each test. PISA estimates each student’s score 
for each item, using the distribution of probabilities of the different PV that the student 
has for the items. This procedure makes it possible to work with more than one 
estimation of student results. 
 
3.3. Results 
 
Table 2 presents the results corresponding to the multilevel regression: the first column 
lists the independent variables7 introduced into the model, grouped into three blocks, 
individual, family or school. These variables have been included as a result of the 
theoretical approaches and empirical evidence described in Subsection 3.1. The second 
column presents the effects of these variables on PISA scores, following the same 
structure presented in Subsection 3.1 (two levels, divided into different areas). Table 3 
provides information about the proportion of the variance explained, for each level, by 
the variables included in the complete model, in comparison to the null model. Nearly 
85% of the variance in scores can be attributed to differences in student characteristics 
within schools. 
 
TABLE 2 HERE 
                                                          
6 Our sample includes 18,283 students from 643 schools. 61.8% of the students in the sample are enrolled 
in PS (61.4% of total schools) and 39.2% in PSPS. Students enrolled in non-subsidised private schools 
are not considered in our analysis. 
7 Further information about the independent variables is provided in Table A2 in the Appendix. 
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The results for the individual level variables are consistent with previous empirical 
evidence. The fact that students born earlier in the year continue to display a 
comparative advantage is also noteworthy. According to OECD (2006) data, women 
score lower than men in science. The strongest effects from among all the factors 
included in the model are linked to the grade repetition variables (REPMORE or 
REPONE). The negative signs of these effects suggest, on the one hand, that grade 
repetition policies are ineffective and, on the other, that it is difficult to determine 
whether repetition of an academic year directly causes low achievement or whether 
“repeaters” have certain characteristics in common -not included in the model- that 
make them low scorers. 
 
TABLE 3 HERE 
 
Household socio-economic and cultural characteristics proved to be very important to 
the explanation of student performance in science. Results associated with the 
immigrant origin of the family are noteworthy: students born in Spain to Spanish 
parents obtain better results in the science test than first-generation immigrant students, 
although score differences compared to second-generation immigrants are not 
significant. This could be interpreted as evidence of a process of assimilating and 
integrating immigrant families, and is reinforced by the fact that first-generation 
immigrant students who have not completed at least the entire compulsory secondary 
education level in Spain (ESO) score lower than first-generation immigrants who have 
been living in Spain for at least four years. Students whose parents are economically 
active and belong to qualified white-collar households achieve higher scores in PISA. 
The results also show a positive and significant relationship between the years of 
schooling of mothers and the educational outcomes of their children.  
 
Other results worthy of note are those related to the analysis of household educational 
resources and their use by students. Certain coefficients of the variables related to 
computer use show that correctly using educational resources (such as computers) has a 
stronger impact on students’ educational outcomes than the simple fact of having 
educational resources available at home. Similarly, the number of books in the 
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household would appear to be a suitable proxy for family cultural capital, and is 
strongly and positively correlated with PISA outcomes.  
 
Ceteris paribus, students in PS obtain better results in the PISA science test than those 
enrolled in PSPS. This result must be emphasized, as previous studies of this subject in 
Spain, such as Mancebón & Muñiz (2008) and Calero & Escardíbul (2007), found no 
significant differences in public and private school educational outcomes and, in the 
bivariate analysis, the former score lower than the latter.  
 
According to the results, peer effects are the most important variables at the school 
level. The results in Table 2 also show that the negative impact upon students’ 
educational outcomes of sharing their class with immigrant students is only significant 
when their proportion exceeds a certain threshold. The educational level of mothers has 
a positive effect not only upon their children but also upon their children’s classmates. 
Additionally, the proportion of girls at school is directly related to outcomes in PISA.  
 
The only significant variables among the school resources factors included in our 
analysis were class size and the instructional computers/school size ratio. Large class 
size appears to have a negative effect on educational outcomes. The strong and negative 
sign linked to the ratio of computers variable remains unexplained and should be the 
subject of further research (a negative correlation between the ratio of computers and 
the reading results for Switzerland in PISA-2000 was also found by Meunier, 2008). 
The lack of significance of variables such as the student/teacher ratio or the existence of 
school counselors should help policymakers to measure the opportunity cost of common 
input-based policies. 
  
Finally, no significant effects were found among the educational practices variables. 
Different types of school autonomy were shown to be irrelevant. However, deeper 
insight into this factor would require more detailed data on different aspects of 
autonomy. Consequently, our results in this area should be treated with caution. When 
interpreting the ability grouping variables, it must be remembered that, although non-
significant on average, ability grouping policies may have important effects on different 
types of students, as explained in Subsection 3.1. 
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4. Public and publicly-subsidized private high schools in Spain: efficiency 
assessment from PISA-2006 data 
 
In this section, an efficiency analysis of the PS and PSPS participating in PISA-2006 is 
performed, using DEA methodology. The analysis involves comparing the academic 
results obtained by pupils in each school with all the inputs relevant to the obtaining of 
those results. A school is considered efficient if no other in the sample achieves better 
outcomes with equal or fewer resources. Conversely, an inefficient school obtains from 
its inputs results inferior to those potentially achievable. 
 
The three stages required by any productive efficiency analysis are now described in 
turn: the selection of inputs and outputs, the selection of the evaluation model and the 
discussion of the results.  
 
4.1. The selection of Spanish high school inputs and outputs for DEA analysis 
 
The first stage in the performance of a productive efficiency analysis is the selection of 
the variables to proxy the results and inputs of evaluated decision-making units 
(DMUs). In this regard, the data supplied by PISA-2006 are plentiful. As explained in 
Section 3, this international program supplies detailed information about student 
competence in different subjects (mathematics, reading and science), their socio-
economic and family background, and school inputs. 
 
The prescriptions generally accepted in the DEA literature concerning variable selection 
establish that this must observe certain minimum requirements, as established by 
Bessent & Bessent (1980): a conceptual basis for the relationship of inputs to outputs; 
an empirically inferred relationship of measured inputs to outputs; increases in inputs 
must be associated with increases in outputs; and the measurements must not have zero 
elements.  
 
In order to fulfill all these conditions, we base the selection of variables on the results 
obtained from empirical research into the determinants of educational outcomes in 
PISA-2006 (see Section 3). Specifically, we select the scores of 15-year-old students in 
science competencies as the output of Spanish PS and PSPS, and all the statistically 
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significant variables described in the previous section as inputs (model 1)8. Table A3 in 
the Appendix summarizes the average and standard deviation for all these variables. 
 
In summary, the efficiency of the Spanish PS and PSPS participating in PISA-2006 is 
estimated on the basis of 12 variables. One of these (PV) proxies output, two 
approximate the resources available to each school (IRATCO and CLSIZ) and the 
remaining nine proxy students’ socio-economic and cultural background.  
 
4.2. The selection of the DEA model 
 
In addition to the choice of input variables, efficiency analysis requires deciding how to 
measure performance. In recent years, during which the assessment of the efficiency of 
different samples of educational institutions has seen notable growth, it has become 
clear that parametric techniques have major drawbacks as instruments for assessing the 
results of academic institutions. By contrast, non-parametric frontier methods, such as 
DEA, have shown themselves to be much more attractive in this context. The 
advantages claimed for this methodology in the assessment of school efficiency have 
been reinforced by its intensive use (Worthington, 2001). The basic approach of DEA is 
to view schools as productive units which use multiple inputs (controllable and non-
controllable) and outputs. The method produces measurements of school efficiency by 
deriving a frontier production function (efficiency frontier) and measuring the distance 
of observations to this frontier. Observations on the frontier obtain an efficiency score 
of 1, while those under it obtain scores below 1, depending on their location. 
 
This technique, based on mathematical programming, has evolved considerably since it 
first appeared in the seminal paper of Charnes, Cooper & Rhodes (1978). Specifically, 
multiple extensions of the initial model have attempted to adapt the mathematical 
formulation and the process of obtaining efficiency indices to the peculiarities of the 
particular sector analyzed, to the nature of the variables constituting the analysis, or to 
the aims of the research in question (see Cooper, Seiford & Zhu, 2004a and 2004b; 
Thanassoulis, 2001). 
                                                          
8 We select those variables from the previous section which have been proved to be significantly 
influential upon academic outcomes in PISA and are non-categorical. Each input has been defined in such 
a way that its relationship to the output variable is positive. Below, we analyze three alternative 
specifications, in order to contrast the sensitivity of the DEA results. 
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From among the different proposals provided by the literature, the approach adopted by 
Silva Portela & Thanassoulis (2001), based on Charnes et al. (1981), is of particular 
interest for the task at hand. This approach decomposes the overall measurement of 
efficiency, computed using DEA, into managerial and program components. This 
approach is attractive, for it permits us to differentiate between inefficiencies 
attributable to the individual management of a decision-making unit (hereafter DMU) 
and those attributable to a unit’s management program. This property interests us 
greatly, since we are attempting to compare the behavior of schools employing different 
management models. We shall explain this approach using Figure 1. 
 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
This represents an organization (Z) which plays its productive role according to a 
specific management model (model A). Its efficiency is to be evaluated compared to a 
set of organizations, of which some employ the same management model (A) and the 
rest are guided by a different model (model B). The application of DEA to both 
subsamples will identify the two frontiers observable in the figure. 
 
The assessment of the output of organization Z in relation to all the schools in the 
sample (regardless of the management model for each), employing DEA, will attribute 
an overall rate to this organization with a value of Z’Z’’’/Z’Z (maximum output in the 
sector/real output of Z). This ratio, since it is the result of comparison with all schools in 
the sector, includes those effects due to individual school management and those 
attributable to the structural differences between the two management programs 
coexisting in the sample.  
 
In order to determine what part of Z’s efficiency is attributable to individual 
management (managerial efficiency), its production must be compared to that of the 
remaining schools having the same management model i.e. model A. The value of the 
efficiency index which DEA will now attribute to Z will be Z’Z’’/ Z’Z (maximum 
output in model A/real output of Z). This efficiency, being the result of comparison with 
organizations functioning under the same management model, is attributable only to 
individual school practices. 
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Finally, Z’s program efficiency will be the residual part of the overall efficiency not 
attributable to individual management. Graphically, this is determined by the index 
Z’Z’’’/ Z’Z’’ (maximum output in the sector/output which Z would use, if its individual 
management were efficient). We can thus immediately confirm that: 
 
Overall Efficiency = (Managerial Efficiency) x (Program Efficiency)  (6) 
 
From this relationship the different efficiency indices may be computed by resolving 
three DEA models similar to that in Equation 7: one for DMUs employing model A 
(managerial efficiency of type A units); another for those guided by model B 
(managerial efficiency of type B units); and a third for all schools (overall efficiency of 
each organization). Program efficiency is obtained using a simple quotient between 
overall and managerial efficiency. 
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0  is the efficiency score of each school, ijx  is the input i of school j, jy  is the output of 
school j and j  are the Lambda values (the raw weights assigned to the peer units of 
each school)9. 
 
5. Results of the efficiency analysis 
 
Table 4 presents the results from the efficiency analysis performed according to the 
previously established criteria10. 
                                                          
9 Further details regarding the significance of Lambda values can be found in any reference book on DEA 
models, such as Cooper et al. (2004a). 
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TABLE 4 HERE 
 
The first row shows the efficiency rates resulting exclusively from the individual 
performance of each school. The results of PS in this column cannot be compared to 
those of PSPS, since the reference frontier used in each case was different. The second 
row displays the efficiency attributable to structural differences between the 
management models, public or private, employed by each school. This value has the 
greatest interest for the aims of the present research. Finally, the third row shows the 
estimations of overall efficiency i.e. the comparison of all schools in the sample, 
independently of ownership type. Therefore, this value includes the effects of individual 
performance (managerial efficiency) and those of the managerial model employed in PS 
and PSPS (program efficiency). 
 
The results in Table 4 indicate that the difference between overall efficiency in PS and 
PSPS is very slight and statistically non-significant. That is to say, once differences in 
student characteristics and school resources are taken into account, the advantages that 
PSPS display in crude educational results disappear. However, overall efficiency 
comprises the effects of both individual school performance and school management 
model, meaning that overall efficiency rates do not allow us to correctly interpret the 
crude results obtained in this paper without first decomposing managerial and program 
efficiency. For example, it may be the case that even though differences in overall 
efficiency between PS and PSPS were not detected, the formers’ management model 
could negatively affect their result, and that the individual performance of each PS 
compensates for the disadvantage of adopting a much more bureaucratic management 
model compared to PSPS.  
 
To resolve this question, we must consider the results provided in the second row in 
Table 4 i.e. the efficiency due to structural differences between management models 
(program efficiency). Although overall efficiency values do not display great 
divergence, the differences found in this case become statistically significant in favor of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
10 The efficiency estimations were computed using ONFRONT software. The DEAs were performed 
under the variable returns to scale assumption (Banker, Charnes & Cooper, 1984) and designed for 
assessing technical output efficiency. 
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PS. Additionally, the percentage of schools which display maximum overall efficiency 
(values in brackets in Table 4) is considerably higher among PS than PSPS, leading us 
to conclude that best practices are implemented by a higher proportion of PS than PSPS. 
 
In order to contrast the robustness of these results we perform a sensitivity analysis. 
Such analyses are very important when using DEA, due to its non-parametric nature. 
We propose three alternative specifications for the previously solved model 1. We 
remove the variable CLSIZE (model 2), then the variable IRATCO (model 3) and, 
finally, remove education resources, CLSIZE and IRATCO (model 4). The effects of 
these variables upon educational outcomes are unclear, to judge by earlier literature 
(Hanushek, 2003). Furthermore, we wish to analyze whether the differences found in 
program efficiencies between PS and PSPS are reduced when these resources are 
removed from DEA models. 
 
TABLE 5 HERE 
 
Table 5 displays the program efficiency scores for the four specifications described 
above. The results are robust in the four different models. Once differences in pupils 
background, school resources and individual management inefficiencies are removed, 
Spanish PS are more efficient than their PSPS counterparts. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The present paper performs a non-parametric efficiency analysis of Spanish PS and 
PSPS, using as reference the data supplied by PISA-2006. For the analysis to be 
rigorous, a detailed study of the determinants of students’ educational outcomes is 
made, employing HLM. Given the absence of any generalized empirical consensus 
regarding the variables stimulating students’ academic success, we believe that any 
evaluation of school efficiency requires a thorough analysis of the empirical relationship 
between the variables selected as inputs and outputs. 
 
The principal results obtained in this regard indicate the special importance of 
household socio-economic and cultural characteristics in explaining student 
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performance in science competencies. Other variables of great influence upon 
educational results at the individual level are gender, grade repetition and household 
educational resources (such as books and computers) and their use by students. Nearly 
85% of the variance in scores can be attributed to differences in student characteristics 
within schools.  
 
At the school level, peer effects (the educational level of mothers, proportion of girls at 
school and proportion of immigrant students) are the most important variables 
concerning the achievement of good results in science competencies. The only 
significant variables among the school resources factors included in our analysis were 
class size and the instructional computers/school size ratio. 
 
These results, which confirm those of a number of previous studies, allowed us to 
further develop our efficiency analysis of PS and PSPS in Spain. The most important 
result was that PS are more efficient than PSPS; the better scores attained by PSPS in 
science competencies, as measured in PISA 2006, cease to exist when student 
characteristics and individual management inefficiencies are discounted. The results are 
robust in the different specifications of the DEA model, as shown by the sensitivity 
analysis. 
 
This conclusion is in line with those reached in other, international, studies, where 
private high schools are shown to be inefficient compared to their public counterparts 
(Braun, Jenkins & Grigg (2006); Lubienski & Lubienski (2006); Barbetta & Turati, 
2003; Kirjavainen & Loikkanen, 1998)11. 
 
In the context of PISA data, the conclusions extracted from comparative efficiency 
analyses of public and private schools are mixed. While Calero & Waisgrais (2009) 
show that Spanish private (PSPS and private independent) schools exert a negative 
influence upon science competencies, as measured by PISA-2006, other papers 
employing PISA-2003 data for Spain indicate that neither PS nor PSPS are superior 
(Perelman & Santín, 2008; Calero & Escardíbul, 2007). The principal conclusion of the 
last-named authors is that once the effects related to the social composition of schools 
are discounted, the differences in educational performance become statistically non-
                                                          
11 A detailed discussion of this issue can be found in Lubienski, Weitzel & Lubienski (2009). 
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significant. This invites the conclusion that these differences are more closely related to 
student type in each school and to the differential characteristics of each school than to 
school quality. 
 
Since Calero & Escardíbul (2007) focus their analyses on the results from the 
mathematics assessment in PISA-2003, the explanation of divergences with regard to 
our work and to that of Calero & Waisgrais (2009), using PISA-2006, is possibly to be 
found in a certain specialization of PS in science, a subject in which PSPS prove to be 
less efficient, according to our results12. The empirical testing of this hypothesis is 
unfortunately far beyond the objectives of the present paper, but could be a specific 
issue for further research. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12 In our view, it is unsurprising that PS appear to be more efficient than PSPS. In Finland, a benchmark 
for educational outcomes in every edition of PISA, almost all schools are public.  
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Table 1. Total population and sample size for Spain in PISA-2006 
15-year-old population 439,415 
Number of students  19,604 
Weighted number of students  381,686 
Number of schools  682 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration, based on PISA-2006 data. 
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Table 2. Estimation of fixed effects with robust standard errors in the HLM 
 
Area Variable Coefficient 
 INTERCEPT 352.4***
  (6.4)
Individual  
 AGE 8.9***
  (2.7)
 GIRLS -17.8***
  (-10.1)
 REPMORE (student enrolled in 1st or 2nd year of compulsory secondary education).  -110.7***
  (-27.6)
 REPONE (student enrolled in 3rd year of compulsory secondary education). -65.8***
 Ref: Student enrolled in 4th year of compulsory secondary education (-29.7)
Household 1. Socioeconomic and cultural characteristics 
 SECGEN (born in Spain; immigrant parents) 8.2
  (0.7)
 FIRST3 (born in a foreign country; in Spain for 3 years or less) -38.0***
  (-3.4)
 FIRST4 (born in a foreign country; in Spain for 4 or more years) -20.7**
 Ref: Born in Spain; Spanish parents (-2.2)
 LANG2 (national student that speaks a non-national language at home) -6.0
  (-0.5)
 LANG3 (foreign student that speaks a national language at home) 7.7
  (0.9)
 LANG4 (foreign student that speaks a non-national language at home) 2.7
 Ref: National student that speaks a national language at home (0.2)
 ACTIVE (both parents are economically active) 13.1***
  (5.8)
 NQWHITEC (white collar, low skilled father) -7.2**
  (-2.5)
 QBLUEC (blue collar, high skilled father) -5.4**
  (-2.0)
 NQBLUEC (blue collar, low skilled father) -8.5***
 Ref: White collar, high skilled father (-3.0)
 MOTSCHY(years of schooling of the mother) 0.8***
  (2.9)
 FATSCHY (years of schooling of the father) 0.4
  (1.2)
Household 2. Educational resources and their use 
 NCOMPUT (no computer at home) -7.1
  (-1.4)
 SPUSECOM (sporadic use of computers) -6.3**
  (-2.5)
 NUSECOM (never uses a computer) 1.9
 Ref: Frequent use of computers (-2.0)
 SPOWRITE (sporadic use of word processors) 
 
7.7***
 (3.2)
 NEVWRITE (never uses word processors) -16.0***
 Ref: Frequent use of word processors (-4.6)
 25BOOKS (0 to 25 books at home) -42.2***
  (-13.2)
 100BOOKS (26 to 100 books at home) -21.0***
  (-7.9)
 200BOOKS (101 to 200 books at home) -9.1***
 Ref: More than 200 books at home (-3.2)
School 1. School characteristics 
 PRIVPUBF (publicly subsidized private high school) -15.2***
  (-1.7)
 SCHSIZ (school size) -0.0
  (-0.1)
 CITYSIZ2 (school in a city with a population of 100.000 to 1.000.000 inhabitants) 5.8
  (1.5)
 CITYSIZ3 (school in a city with a population higher than 1.000.000 inhabitants) 21.6***
 Ref: School in town with a population smaller than 100.000 (3.5)
 NOTHERSC (few schools in the neighbourhood -maximum, 2-) 0.1
 31
  (0.0)
School 2. Students characteristics 
 ORINMIG1 (proportion of immigrant students from 0,1 to 10%) 0.0
 (0.0)
 ORINMIG2 (proportion of immigrant students from 10 to 20%) -9.9*
 (-1.7)
 ORINMIG3 (proportion of immigrant students higher than 20%) -17.7***
 (-3.4)
 SCEDMO (average years of schooling of the mothers) 2.9**
 (2.6)
 PCGIRLS (proportion of girls at school) 44.4**
  (2.0)
 SCNQWHIT (white collar, low skilled parents -mode-) -6.4
  (-1.0)
 SCQBLUE (blue collar, high skilled parents -mode-) 3.5
  (0.8)
 SCNQBLUE (blue collar, low skilled parents -mode-) -3.2
 Ref: White collar, skilled parents -mode- (-0.6)
School 3. School resources 
 STRATIO (student-teacher ratio) 0.3
  (0.6)
 PTEACH (proportion of part-time teachers ) 0.1
 (0.5)
 CLSIZ (class size) -0.2*
  (-1.9)
 COMPWEB (proportion of computers connected to the Internet) -1.9
 (-0.3)
 IRATCO (ratio of computers for instruction to school size) -60.1***
 (-2.9)
 NCOUNS (no school counsellors at the centre) -0.3
  (-0.1)
School 4. Educational practices 
 AUTCONT (school with autonomy in selecting teachers for hire) -3.9
 (-1.2)
 AUTBUDG (school with budgetary autonomy) 4.3
  (1.1)
 AUTEXT (autonomy for selecting textbooks) 5.1
 (0.8)
 AUTCONTE (school with autonomy for selecting course contents) 2.9
 (0.4)
 AUTOCU (school autonomy for modifying the curriculum) -3.6
  (-0.9)
 CRITADMI (religious or philosophical issues are used as an admittance criterion) 2.9
  (0.7)
 STREB (ability grouping between classes) -3.9
  (-1.2)
 STREW (ability grouping within classes) -1.1
 (-0.3)
 Number of level units  18.283
 
a *** statistically significant at the 0.01 level; **, statistically significant at the 0.05 level; *, statistically 
significant at the 0.10 level; t-ratio (in brackets). Estimations were computed using HLM 6.25. 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on PISA-2006 data. 
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Table 3. Multilevel regression: random effects 
Variances Null model 
Complete 
model 
Schools (uj) 1,221.8 411.9
Students (ij) 6,748.3 4,117.3
Total (uj + ij) 7,970.1 4,529.2
% of total variance explained by variables   43.2
% of level 1 (students) variance explained by variables  39.0
% of level 2 (schools) variance explained by variables  66.3
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration, based on PISA-2006 data. 
 
 
Table 4. Efficiency scores of inefficient schools 
  Mean efficiency ANOVA test 
  PSPS PS Total Dif. on means Standard error Test 
Managerial efficiency 0.930 0.926 0.928 0.004 0.009 0.478 
Program efficiency 0.962 0.982 0.964 -0.020 0.005 -3.996***
Overall efficiency 
0.919 0.925 0.923 -0.006 0.008 -0.764 
(20.05) (43.64) (37.20)    
 
a *** indicates statistically significant differences between PSPS and PS at a 1% significance level.  
b Figures in brackets are the percentage of schools with maximum efficiency (>0.99). 
 
 
Table 5. Program efficiency scores using alternative DEA models (inefficient schools) 
 Mean efficiency ANOVA test 
 PSPS PS Total Dif. on means 
Standard 
error Test 
Model 1 0.962 0.982 0.964 -0.020 0.005 -3.99*** 
Model 2 0.960 0.988 0.965 -0.027 0.007 -4.01*** 
Model 3 0.963 0.981 0.966 -0.018 0.007 -2.64*** 
Model 4 0.964 0.987 0.969 -0.022 0.007 -3.41*** 
 
a *** indicates statistically significant differences between PSPS and PS at a 1% 
significance level 
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Figure 1. Efficiency decomposition according to Silva Portela & Thanassoulis 
(2001). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Input 
Output 
Frontier management model B 
Frontier management model A 
Z’’’ 
Z’’ 
Z’ 
Z
 34
Table A1. Student profiles in Spanish PS and PSPS   
Type of variable Questionnaire item PSPS PS Total ANOVA test 
Results Years repeated (REPMORE & REPONE) 1.20 1.18 1.18 0.94 
Expectations - 
aspirations Students’ expected occupational status (BSMJ) 62.24 57.92 59.17 5.79*** 
Attitudes toward 
science 
Plausible value in interest in science (PVINTR) 526.23 539.47 535.86 -3.51*** 
Plausible value in support for scientific inquiry 
(PVSUPP) 530.53 526.94 527.92 0.77 
General interest in learning science (INTSCIE) -0.17 -0.19 -0.19 0.64 
Enjoyment of science (JOYSCIE) -0.11 -0.17 -0.15 1.87* 
Science self-efficacy (SCIEEFF) -0.01 -0.13 -0.10 3.49*** 
General value of science (GENSCIE) 0.34 0.26 0.28 2.65*** 
Personal value of science (PERSCIE) 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.81 
Science activities (SCIEACT) -0.14 -0.16 -0.15 0.76 
Personal Age (AGE) 15.83 15.82 15.82 0.36 
Occupational 
status of parents 
Mother’s occupational status. SEI index 
(BMMJ) 41.22 36.07 37.59 4.34*** 
Father’s occupational status. SEI index (BFMJ) 44.56 38.15 39.93 7.00*** 
Highest occupational status of parents. SEI 
index (HISEI) 47.82 41.11 42.96 6.85*** 
Educational level 
of parents 
Mother’s years of schooling (MOTSCY) 10.39 8.80 9.24 5.79*** 
Father’s years of schooling (FATSCY) 10.60 8.72 9.24 7.33*** 
Maximum years of schooling of parents 
(PARESCY) 11.90 10.32 10.75 6.78*** 
Household 
possessions scale 
indices  
Index of family wealth possessions (WEALTH) -0.07 -0.23 -0.18 4.87*** 
Index of cultural possessions at home 
(CULTPOSS) 0.19 0.00 0.05 5.30*** 
Index of home educational resources 
(HEDRES) 0.32 0.17 0.21 4.51*** 
Index of home possessions (HOMEPOS) 0.22 -0.02 0.04 6.74*** 
Index of economic, social and cultural status 
(ESCS) -0.08 -0.57 -0.44 7.30*** 
a ***, ** and * indicate statistically significant mean differences between PSPS and PS at the 1%, 5% and 
10% significance level, respectively. 
b Name of the variable in the PISA database in brackets. 
 Source: Authors’ elaboration based on PISA-2006 data. 
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Table A2. Variables employed in the HLM 
 
  N Min. Max Mean 
Standard 
Dev. 
Individual 
AGE (student's age, in years) 18,283 15.33 16.33 15.84 0.29 
WOMEN (gender dummy: 1 if female) 18,283 0 1 0.50 0.50 
REPMORE (1st-2nd year of ESO) 18,283 0 1 0.06 0.23 
REPONE (3rd year of ESO) 18,283 0 1 0.26 0.44 
NOREPET (4rd year of ESO) 18,283 0 1 0.68 0.47 
Household 1. Socio-economic and cultural 
characteristics 
NATIONAL (born in Spain; Spanish parents) 18,283 0 1 0.95 0.21 
SECGEN (born in Spain; immigrant parents) 18,283 0 1 0.01 0.07 
FIRST3 (born abroad; in Spain for 3 or less years) 18,283 0 1 0.02 0.12 
FIRST4 (born abroad; in Spain for 4 or more years) 18,283 0 1 0.03 0.16 
LANG1 (national; national language at home) 18,283 0 1 0.94 0.23 
LANG2 (national; non-national language at home) 18,283 0 1 0.01 0.08 
LANG3 (foreign; national language at home) 18,283 0 1 0.04 0.20 
LANG4 (foreign; non-national language at home) 18,283 0 1 0.13 0.11 
ACTIVE (both parents economically active) 18,283 0 1 0.72 0.44 
QWHITEC (white collar, highly-skilled father) 18,283 0 1 0.33 0.45 
NQWHITEC (white collar, low-skilled father) 18,283 0 1 0.14 0.34 
QBLUEC (blue collar, highly-skilled father) 18,283 0 1 0.33 0.45 
NQBLUEC (blue collar, low-skilled father) 18,283 0 1 0.20 0.38 
MOTSCY (years of schooling: mother) 18,283 3.5 16.5 10.53 3.96 
FATSCY (years of schooling: father) 18,283 3.5 16.5 10.55 3.98 
Household 2. Educational resources and their use 
NCOMPUT (dummy: 1 if no computer at home) 18,283 0 1 0.10 0.30 
REGUSECO (student uses computers frequently) 18,283 0 1 0.70 0.42 
SPUSECOM (student uses computers occasionally) 18,283 0 1 0.24 0.24 
NUSECOM (student never uses computers) 18,283 0 1 0.06 0.46 
REGWRITE (uses word processors frequently) 18,283 0 1 0.15 0.35 
SPOWRITE (uses word processors occasionally) 18,283 0 1 0.76 0.42 
NEVWRITE (never uses word processors) 18,283 0 1 0.09 0.28 
25BOOKS (0-25 books at home) 18,283 0 1 0.17 0.37 
100BOOKS (26-100 books at home) 18,283 0 1 0.33 0.47 
200BOOKS (101-200 books at home) 18,283 0 1 0.22 0.41 
500BOOKS (over 200 books at home) 18,283 0 1 0.27 0.44 
School 1. School characteristics 
PUBLIC (public school) 18,283 0 1 0.62 0.48 
PRIVPUBF (private school; publicly funded) 18,283 0 1 0.38 0.48 
SCHSIZ (school size) 18,283 50 2,539 675.49 389.59 
CITYSIZ1 (population <100.000) 18,283 0 1 0.61 0.49 
CITYSIZ2 (population 100.000-1,000.000) 18,283 0 1 0.36 0.48 
CITYSIZ3 (population  >1.000.000) 18,283 0 1 0.03 0.16 
NOTHERSC (maximum, 2 centers near the school) 18,283 0 1 0.32 0.46 
School 2. Student characteristics 
ORINMIG0 (school without immigrants) 18,283 0 1 0.48 0.50 
ORINMIG1 (0,1-10% immigrant students) 18,283 0 1 0.36 0.48 
ORINMIG2 (10-20% immigrant students) 18,283 0 1 0.10 0.31 
ORINMIG3 (>20% immigrant students) 18,283 0 1 0.05 0.23 
SCEDMO (average years of schooling of mothers) 18,283 6.29 15.98 10.53 1.71 
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PCGIRLS (proportion of girls at school) 18,283 0.49 0.08 0 0.91 
SCQWHITE (white collar, high skilled -mode-) 18,283 0 1 0.40 0.49 
SCNQWHIT (white collar, low skilled -mode-) 18,283 0 1 0.02 0.13 
SCQBLUE (blue collar, high skilled -mode) 18,283 0 1 0.45 0.50 
SCNQBLUE (blue collar, low skilled -mode-) 18,283 0 1 0.13 0.34 
School 3. School resources 
STRATIO (student-teacher ratio) 18,283 1.19 30.55 11.74 4.37 
PTEACH (proportion of part-time teachers) 18,283 6.73 6.98 0 79 
CLSIZ (class size) 18,283 13 53 25.94 10.13 
COMPWEB (proportion of computers with Internet) 18,283 0.07 1 0.89 0.17 
IRATCO (computers for instruction/ school size) 18,283 0.01 0.72 0.11 0.08 
School 4. Educational practices 
NCOUNS (1=no school counselors at the center) 18,283 0 1 0.20 0.39 
AUTCONT (autonomy for selecting teachers for hire) 18,283 0 1 0.37 0.48 
AUTBUDG (budgetary autonomy) 18,283 0 1 0.60 0.49 
AUTEXT (autonomy for selecting textbooks) 18,283 0 1 0.95 0.23 
AUTCONTE (autonomy for selecting contents) 18,283 0 1 0.57 0.49 
AUTOCU (autonomy for modifying the curriculum) 18,283 0 1 0.54 0.50 
CRITADMI (religious or philosophical issues are used as an 
admitance criterion) 18,283 0 1 0.30 0.45 
STREB (ability grouping between classes) 18,283 0 1 0.48 0.47 
STREW (ability groupong within classes) 18,283 0 1 0.44 0.46 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on PISA-2006 data. 
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Table A3. Variables used in the DEA model 
Variable Definition 
PSPS PS  Total 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.  Mean S.D. 
Output: PVS Outcome in science (plausible 
value) 502.86 85.69 475.08 90.07  488.14 90.60
Input 1: 
NATIONAL 
Percentage of students born in 
Spain 95.19% 0.76 90.04% 0.96  91.88% 0.68 
Input 2: PCGIRLS Proportion of girls at school 52.11% 2.01 48.64% 0.68  49.46% 0.72 
Input 3: NOREPET Percentage of students not 
repeating any grade 72.43% 1.26 51.19% 1.07  59.84% 0.85 
Input 4: MOTSCY Mother’s years of schooling 10.39 4.43 8.80 4.67  9.63 4.73 
Input 5: 
REGWRITE & 
SPOWRITE 
Percentage of students using 
computers frequently or 
occasionally to create 
documents 
89.64% 0.77 84.51% 0.87  86.82% 0.60 
Input 6: QWHITEC Percentage of students  whose 
father's job is white collar 
highly- skilled 
38.21% 2.07 22.30% 1.10  30.69% 1.00 
Input 7: LANG1 Percentage of  native students 
who speak national language at 
home 
93.32% 0.79 87.19% 1.05  89.16% 0.75 
Input 8: 500BOOKS Percentage of students with 
over 200 books at home 28.32% 1.48 17.99% 0.86  23.95% 0.86 
Input 9: ACTIVE Percentage of students whose 
father and mother are both in 
active working population 
73.83% 1.24 65.12% 1.02  68.98% 0.76 
Input10: IRATCO Ratio of instructional 
computers to school size 
(reverse) 
15.93 0.04 8.36 0.10  9.96 0.09 
Input 11: CLSIZ Average class size  30.43 10.91 26.29 8.33  27.78 9.67 
a Variables were redefined in such a way that their relationship with output was positive, a basic requirement 
of DEA models for the estimation of efficiency. 
 Source: Authors’ elaboration, based on PISA-2006 data. 
 
 
 
